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summArY
Out-of-hospital patient transportation (retrieval) of critically ill patients occurs within highly complex environments. 
Adverse events are not uncommon. Incident monitoring provides a means to better understand such events. 
The aim of this study was to characterize incidents occurring during retrieval to provide a basis for developing 
 corrective strategies.
Four organizations contributed 125 reports, documenting 272 incidents; 91% of forms documented incidents as 
preventable. Incidents related to equipment (37%), patient care (26%), transport operations (11%), interpersonal 
communication (9%), planning or preparation (9%), retrieval staff (7%) and tasking (2%). Incidents occurred 
during patient transport to the receiving facility (26%), at patient origin (26%), during patient loading (20%), at the 
retrieval service base (18%) and receiving facility (9%).  Contributing factors were system-based for 54% and human-
based for 42%. Haste (7.5%), equipment malfunctioning (7.2%) or missing (5.5%), failure to check (5.8%) and 
pressure to proceed (5.2%) were the most frequent contributing factors. Harm was documented in 59% of incidents 
with one death. Minimizing factors were good crew skills/teamwork (42%), checking equipment (17%) and patient 
(8%), patient monitors (15%), good luck (14%) and good interpersonal communication (4%). 
Incident monitoring provides sufficient insight into retrieval incidents to be a useful quality improvement tool for 
retrieval services. Information gathered suggested improvements in retrieval equipment design and use of alternative 
power sources, the use of pro formae for equipment checking, patient assessment, preparation for transportation and 
information transfer. Lessons from incidents in other areas applicable to retrieval should be linked for analysis with 
retrieval incidents. 
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medical care is delivered in “a dynamic environment 
with complex interactions between pathophysiologic 
and disease processes, medical staff, infrastructure, 
equipment, policies and protocols”1. medical record 
review has shown that adverse events (incidents 
resulting in harm to a patient) occur in association 
with 10% of hospital admissions2-4. Patients most 
at risk are the elderly and those receiving urgent, 
complex interventions2,3,6-8. medical record review, 
however, tells us little about how and why things go 
wrong5. Insight into the nature of these events and 
their contributing factors has come from a number 
of incident reporting systems, including those from 
critical care disciplines9-15. such insight is necessary to 
devise preventive and corrective strategies.
Out-of-hospital patient transportation (retrieval), 
provides an even greater challenge as it occurs within 
a much more complex, dynamic, unpredictable 
and uncontrolled environment16. retrieval involves 
patients with a severity of illness and observed mor-
tality in excess of those for similar non-transported 
patients17-19. Adverse events such as hypoxia, hypo-
tension, missed injuries, problems with vascular 
access, the airway, ventilation, and spine and limb 
immobilization have been documented during re-
trieval and are associated with increased patient 
morbidity and mortality19-27. unresolved physiological 
instability prior to transport and lack of retrieval team 
experience contribute to these events, whilst correc- 
tion of physiological instability prior to transport and 
the use of experienced retrieval teams reduces the 
severity of adverse events28,29.
medical retrieval also involves other emergency 
services and vehicle providers. vehicle accidents 
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during patient transport, although infrequent, can 
have serious consequences. Aeromedical emergency 
service accident rates peaked in the early 1980s at 
approximately 25 accidents per 100 000 flight hours30 
but more recently have been measured at 5 accidents 
per 100 000 flight hours31. The road ambulance 
accident rate is approximately 55 accidents per 
100 000 transports32.
The aim of this study was to set up incident reporting 
to collect and characterize problems occurring during 
retrieval and to identify their associated contributing 
and minimizing factors with a view to devising 
preventive and corrective strategies.
mATerIAls AnD meTHODs
A generic incident reporting form developed by the 
Australian Patient safety Foundation (APsF)33 for 
the Anaesthetic Incident monitoring study (AIms)6 
formed the basis of the retrieval Incident monitoring 
study (rIms) incident report form. 
Initially, transport medical records were reviewed 
from the nrmA CareFlight, new south Wales 
medical retrieval service. In these records, retrieval 
medical staff voluntarily documented factors, in a free 
text format, that they considered to have impacted 
upon the course of a retrieval. Analysis of segments 
of this information has been reported elsewhere16, 
and was used to develop the retrieval-specific 
section of the rIms form and the rIms incident 
classification system. Drafts of the rIms form were 
circulated amongst participating organizations for 
final agreement. 
ethical approval was gained from the Western 
sydney Area Health service Human research ethics 
Committee.
Four retrieval organizations participated in the 
study. Two had teams consisting of a physician and a 
paramedic ambulance officer and utilized helicopter, 
fixed wing and road vehicles for a predominantly 
adult patient group. They were capable of rescue, 
‘scene response’ (assessment and treatment at an 
accident or other out-of-hospital location) and 
patient transport from a scene or referring hospital. 
The third organization provided a paediatric/neonatal 
service, staffed by a physician and nurse, using 
helicopter, fixed wing and road vehicles for inter-
hospital missions only. The fourth was staffed by 
flight nurses who conducted nurse only or nurse and 
physician missions using fixed wing aircraft.
each organization nominated a project co- 
ordinator. The majority of clinical staff at each 
organization had prior exposure to incident reporting 
through their medical specialty (e.g. anaesthesia, 
intensive care, emergency medicine). Instructional 
packages and a sealed box for completed forms were 
provided to each site. 
Identifiable information inadvertently included on 
the forms was deleted by APsF staff prior to data 
entry and analysis. All analysis was performed on the 
collated, de-identified data. This was to encourage 
reporting and preserve confidentiality, but did not 
allow for follow-up of missing data. Interim analysis 
of the collated data was provided as feedback to each 
organization midway through the study. 
The free text was classified by two analysts, first 
independently and then following agreement. Other 
fields included on the form were those of incident 
severity, outcomes, prevention, minimizing and con-
tributing factors. Aspects of the form have been 
described elsewhere34. The retrieval-specific incident 
categories are shown in Figure 1. 
Descriptive analysis was used for all pre-coded items 
entered as ordinal data. Chi square analysis was used 
to assess the significance of the relationship, presence 
and absence of the different categories. multinominal 
regression analysis was used to examine for the 
predictive factors under consideration. significance 
was set at a P<0.05.
resulTs
In all, 272 incidents were described on 125 incident 
forms: 62 forms (50%) described multiple incidents. 
In 30 forms (24%), the incidents described were not 
directly associated with patient care. The median age 
of the patients was 42.5 years (range 0.01—84 years), 
54% were females and 64% were intubated and 
ventilated. nine per cent of forms related to a scene 
response. For 117 forms (94%) where preventability 
was reported, 106 (91%) of the forms indicated the 
incidents to be preventable. reporters were doctors 
for 67%, nurses for 32% and paramedics 1% of 
forms.
Figure 1 shows the principal incident categories 
and Tables 1-4 the nature of those incidents for the 
more frequent incident categories. 
mission planning and preparation problems 
occurred mostly at the retrieval service base (n=20). 
retrieval service tasking problems included inappro-
priate choice of vehicle (n=3) and inappropriate 
decision to retrieve the patient (n=1).
Of the equipment problems, ventilator/breathing 
circuit problems (n=26) include breathing circuit 
disconnection, malfunction of unidirectional valve 
and failure of driving gas or electrical supply to the 
ventilator. Problems relating to vascular access (n=7) 
were mostly due to dislodgement of cannulae. Failure 
to provide oxygen cylinders, cylinder fittings and 
sufficient oxygen accounted for the oxygen supply 
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incidents (n=6). none of the documented oxygen 
supply problems involved the transport vehicle on- 
board oxygen supply. Problems with powered medical 
devices were mostly those of failure/exhaustion 
of their power supply (n=15). stretcher and/or 
stretcher lifting device (n=10) problems were due to 
malfunction or unavailability. 
Patient care problems are listed in Table 2. They 
occurred mostly at the site of patient origin, prior to 
and following retrieval team arrival and at the receiving 
hospital. Patient care problems tended to be acute, 
unexpected, requiring intervention and technically 
challenging. medication errors accounted for 10%, 
and the airway (accidental extubation, unrecognised 
oesophageal intubation and endobronchial intubation) 
12% of all patient care problems.
Incidents involving retrieval staff were inexperience/
figure 1: Incident categories.
table 1
Nature of equipment problems
equipment problems no. %
equipment failure (including power) 37 38
equipment unavailable 15 15
breathing circuit, disconnection 8 8
Other 7 7
Oxygen not available 7 7
vascular access dislodged/disconnected 7 7
Inadequate or inappropriate equipment 5 5
Damaged equipment 4 4
safety equipment not available/inappropriate 4 4
Incorrectly secured equipment 2 2
Oxygen supply exhausted 1 1
Problem with communication means during transport 1 1
table 2
Nature of patient care problems
Patient care problems no. %
Patients condition more severe than expected 15 22
Inappropriate or inadequate preparation at referring 
    site 13 19
Hospital not prepared to receive patient 8 12
Deterioration of patients condition 7 10
medication, dose/drug error 7 10
Inadequate patient preparation for retrieval 4 6
Procedure technically difficult to perform 4 6
Airway obstruction 3 4
Delay in decision to retrieve patient 3 4
Oesophageal intubation 2 3
Accidental extubation 2 3
endobronchial intubation 1 2
table 3
Nature of transport problems
Transport operations problems no. %
Difficulty with patient transfer or loading 6 20
Problem with vehicle configuration for patient transport 6 20
Other problems relating to the vehicle 4 13
Delay in arrival/no ambulance to meet patient 3 10
retrieval aborted or postponed due to weather 3 10
Aviation problem/problem with fuel/other problem 2 7
Problem related to landing site, not suitable 2 7
Other flying operations problems 2 7
Weather forecast unavailable/delayed 1 4
vehicle failure/malfunction 1 4
table 4
Nature of interpersonal communication problems
Interpersonal communication problems no %
receiving hospital not made aware of patient’s condition 7 28
Problem with staff communication 6 24
Inaccurate patient information from site 5 20
staff unhelpful or uncooperative 4 16
unprepared or incomplete referral documentation 3 12
a. flabOuris, W. b. runciman, b. levings
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lacking appropriate skills (n=9), staff not available or 
delayed for mission response (n=6) and crew physical 
injury or exposure to chemical hazards (n=4), none 
of which required further medical attention. Injuries 
occurred during patient loading and to unsecured 
staff in a vehicle whilst accompanying a patient from 
the scene to the receiving hospital. Chemical hazard 
exposure was from a patient with organophosphate 
ingestion. There were also interpersonal conflicts 
(n=4), none of which involved violence, and failure 
to provide, or provision of inadequate, personal 
protective equipment (n=4). 
Figure 2 illustrates the stage of the retrieval at 
which the incident occurred. multiple stages were 
documented on 24 forms (20%). The patient loading 
incidents occurred at the time of departure from the 
site of patient origin.
Table 5 details the incidents relating to the type 
of retrieval vehicle. eighteen forms (14%) were not 
associated with any transport vehicle use. Of the 
forms that documented incidents and the use of a 
transport vehicle, 28% of those forms involved fixed 
wing aircraft, 38% involved helicopters and 35% 
involved road vehicles. The type of transport vehicle 
had no relationship with incident preventability 
(P=0.577) or severity (P=0.642). 
eighty-six forms (69%) documented multiple con-
tributing factors. Of all contributing factors, 54% 
were system-based (latent error, Table 6) and 42% 
were human-based (active error, Table 7) and 4% a 
chance event. 
Incident outcome minimizing factors were docu-
mented on 99 forms (79%). These were good crew 
figure 2: Frequency of incident occurrence by stage of retrieval.
table 5
Nature and number of incidents involving vehicles by type of vehicle
Fixed wing (n=30)
• Difficulty with patient transfer or loading 6
• Problem with fuel 1
• Problem with vehicle configuration for patient transport 1
• Other flying operations problems 1
Helicopter (n=41)
• retrieval aborted or postponed due to weather 3
• Problem with vehicle configuration for patient transport 2
• Problem related to landing site 2
• Inappropriate vehicle chosen for task 1
• Weather forecast unavailable or delayed 1
• Other flying operations problems 1
• Problem with fuel 1
road ambulance (n=37)
• Other problems relating to the vehicle 4
• no ambulance to meet patient 3
• Problem with vehicle configuration for patient transport 3
• Inappropriate vehicle chosen for task 2
• Failure or malfunction 1
skills/teamwork (42%), re-evaluation of equipment 
(17%), re-evaluation of patient (8%), patient moni-
tors (15%), good luck (14%) and good interpersonal 
communication (4%).
Patient or staff harm occurring as an outcome of 
the incident was documented in 59% of forms, whilst 
92% of all forms documented a potential for harm. 
There was one patient death following an undetected 
oesophageal intubation. Availability and use of a 
capnograph was not documented.
Incident severity tended to be greater for the patient 
care (P=0.012), equipment (P=0.017) and planning 
and preparation (P=0.033) incident categories 
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and on occasions when more than one incident was 
documented (P<0.0001). 
DIsCussIOn
Incidents identified during retrievals were mostly 
problems with equipment or patient care. nearly 
half occurred during patient loading or whilst the 
patient was in transit to the receiving facility, and 
26% occurred at the site of patient origin. Almost 
60% of forms documented associated harm and 91% 
documented the incidents as preventable. Human 
factors were reported in 42% and system factors in 
54%, findings consistent with anaesthesia and other 
socio technical endeavours35.
Problems related to equipment contributed to 36% 
of all incidents, similar to the 30%36 and 39%13 of 
reports for anaesthesia-related equipment problems. 
Power failure due to exhaustion of internal batteries 
was the most common problem. Alternative power 
sources, and the means to connect to them, should be 
a key requirement for retrieval operations. These may 
be on board AC or DC power supplies or the carriage 
of spare batteries. The latter is the least efficient 
alternative as they add extra weight and bulk, and 
not all medical equipment uses replaceable batteries 
or batteries of the same type. retrieval services have 
developed innovative strategies, such as stretcher 
bridges37, that attempt to address some of these 
equipment problems.
Example 1
While loading into ambulance, arterial line pressure 
bag fell off patient and became disconnected, with 1 
litre of saline under pressure squirted all over cabin. 
Also during this time, BP noted to be rising steeply. 
Only when went to hand bag patient, noted that 
ETCO2 was 52 mmHg (especially in patient with 
an intracranial haemorrhage). ETCO2 monitor had 
actually detected this, but since turned on had been 
constantly alarming low battery state and audible 
alarms had been disabled! Problems then all corrected, 
with return of BP but impact on patient outcome 
uncertain.
retrieval equipment problems sometimes arose 
because the equipment was sourced from other ser- 
vices (e.g., oxygen supplies/fittings and patient load- 
ing devices from receiving sites). In contrast, there 
were no reports of on-board oxygen or loading 
equipment problems. This suggests that self-reliance 
for equipment by retrieval services should be en-
couraged. This should be accompanied by strategies 
that address the not infrequent problem of missing 
equipment due to failure to check or inadequate 
preparation at the retrieval base. Haste, failure to 
check and pressure to proceed were common 
contributing factors. Failure to check was documented 
in 14% of anaesthesia-related incident reports36; 
equipment checks prior to commencement of an 
table 6
System based contributing factors




• equipment malfunction 32 8.9
• no equipment/monitor 20 5.5
• no other support services  9 2.5
• no bed/facility  8 2.2
• malfunction of other support services  2 0.6
Team Cognitive factors (11.3%)
• Communication problem 16 4.4
• Poor team work 13 3.6
• Inappropriate action  9 2.5
• lack of supervision  3 0.8
management/Corporate culture (9.6%)
• Pressure to proceed 19 5.2
• Poor management decision 16 4.4
Protocols/Policies (6.9%)
• Failure to provide/enforce policy/protocol 13 3.6
• lack of policy/protocol 12 3.3
staff (5%)
• Insufficient training  7 1.9
• staff new/unfamiliar  6 1.7
• Insufficient staff  5 1.4
supplies/labelling (1.2%)
• unsuitable supplies  2 0.6
• lack of supplies  1 0.3
• Poor labelling  1 0.3
table 7
Human based contributing factors




* Failure to check equipment 21 5.8
* Failure to follow policy/protocol 14 3.9
* Took a short cut 9 2.5
* Failure to apply basic patient care 8 2.2
* Failure to act on available information 8 2.2
* Took a risk 7 1.9
* Failure to attend as required 1 0.3
skill based (15%)
* Haste 27 7.5
* Distraction 9 2.5
* Inattention 9 2.5
* Fatigue 8 2.2
* stress 1 0.3
Knowledge based (9.1%)
* unfamiliarity equipment/environment 11 3
* Inadequate/wrong knowledge 10 2.8
* Inexperience/inadequate training 5 1.4
* Technical problem with procedure 4 1.1
* error of diagnosis 3 0.8
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anaesthetic are now mandatory. retrieval services 
should also have mandatory checking procedures.
Examples of equipment problems
1.  Arterial transducer missing. 
2.  Wrights (sic) spirometer malfunction.
3.  Oxylog 2000 (sic) reading flow inoperable. No 
transformer to recharge.
4.  Syringe pumps batteries run out mid-flight due to 
length of time at retrieval site.
5.  Propaq (sic), batteries ran out on arrival at receiving 
hospital.
medical equipment used for retrieval is designed 
primarily for in-hospital use and not for the more 
hazardous out-of-hospital environment. This study 
highlighted the particular occurrence of breathing 
circuit, airway and vascular access problems. equip- 
ment designs more suited to the transport environ-
ment should incorporate design features to prevent 
some of these problems. Failing that, there should 
be provision of a means for their early detection. 
The latter would require the use of reliable patient 
monitors with features such as better artefact rejection, 
appropriate visual38 and audible displays, suitable 
alarm functions, power consumption and size. Within 
aviation, emphasis is given to ‘cockpit’ design and 
ergonomics. similar consideration should be given to 
medical equipment design and placement in relation 
to the ergonomics of the ‘clinical cockpit’ section of 
the transport vehicle. Further work is needed in this 
area.
Problems affecting patient care made up 26% of 
incidents. They related mostly to clinical management 
at the site of patient origin and reception at the 
patient-receiving facility. The importance of early 
resuscitation for critically ill patients39,40, stabilization 
prior to transport and appropriate escorts have been 
well documented28,29 and incorporated into guidelines 
for patient transportation41-43. retrieval teams have 
the capacity to deliver critical care skills where they 
may otherwise not be available. Their capacity to do 
so may be limited by transport operational issues, for 
example the size of retrieval team and the quantity 
of medical equipment that can be transported. In 
these situations early referral, accurate information 
and planning and preparation at the retrieval base are 
crucial. This study identified that the problem of the 
patient’s condition being more severe than expected 
was common, and associated with inadequate referral 
information and treatment at the site of patient origin. 
such problems can be at least partially addressed at a 
local level by access to regional transfer guidelines44, 
and the use of information pro formae at time of 
referral. 
retrieval teams face many challenges when caring 
for the critically ill, especially in remote locations and 
when confined to the retrieval vehicle. Difficulties with 
clinical procedures, equipment problems, problems 
with the airway (including missed oesophageal intu-
bation) drug errors and loading difficulties were 
some of the problems documented. These underscore 
the importance of retrieval team training and the 
use of checklist and crises management algorithms, 
and having the necessary equipment (such as 
capnography). some of the recently published crisis 
management algorithms for anaesthesia could be 
adapted for use in retrieval and during crew resource 
management training by retrieval teams.
Problems at the patient reception facility were 
equipment problems, lack of preparedness to receive 
the patient, and not being forewarned of the patient’s 
condition. The means for good communication be-
tween retrieval and receiving staff prior to patient 
arrival, and its appropriate use, are important but 
frequently overlooked. Appropriate equipment and 
staff should be present when the patient arrives.
Example 2
Patient on GTN infusion and atenolol infusion 
to keep mean arterial pressure less than 100 mmHg. 
At receiving hospital all monitoring removed and no 
adequate bed space and preparation of monitoring. 
At receiving hospital, asked to give handover 4 times 
(3X to medical staff and 1X to nursing staff).
There is debate in the literature in relation to the 
impact of vehicle selection upon patient and system 
outcomes45-48. Transport operational problems were 
documented for 10% of incidents, with certain in-
cidents being associated with particular types of 
vehicles, such as adverse weather with helicopter 
operations, loading difficulties with fixed wing aircraft 
and vehicle configuration with road vehicles. vehicle 
selection was not associated with preventability or 
severity of incidents. Transport operational problems 
documented in this study may have been unique to 
the local environment, and may not necessarily be 
applicable to other services.
Example 3
1.  No keys to open shed where mechanical lifter 
stored. Patient taken onboard by carrying stretcher 
and lifting manually in 2 stages.
2.  Attempted inter hospital transfer. Poor weather 
conditions meant helicopter transfer aborted but 
prolonged road transfer instead.
Factors minimizing retrieval incident outcomes 
were good crew skills and teamwork (42%) and re-
Out-Of-HOspital patient transpOrt
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evaluation of the patient or equipment. Patient 
monitoring was a factor in only 15%, and is in con- 
trast to anaesthetic practice where an equal proportion 
of incidents are first detected by humans and by 
monitors49.  This may reflect a lesser reliance by re- 
trieval staff on monitors because of their reduced 
reliability in association with critically ill patients50, 
the impact of the transport environment51,38 and 
concerns about artifacts and overall frequency of 
equipment problems during retrieval. These obser-
vations further highlight the need for retrieval-specific 
equipment design. They support the use of more 
invasive and reliable means of monitoring during 
retrieval, such as invasive arterial pressure monitoring. 
These observations are consistent with intensive care 
incident reports10 supporting the concept of retrieval, 
being akin to an ‘ICu in the sky’.
retrieval incidents were complex as they often 
involved more than one contributing factor (70%) 
and retrieval stage (20%). minimizing factors were 
mostly complex solutions involving crew skills and 
teamwork, repeated evaluations of equipment and 
patients and good interpersonal communication. 
mitigation of adverse events through productive inter-
action amongst team members and development of 
novel solutions to such problems has been suggested52 
and emphasizes the importance of anticipation of, 
recognition of, training for, and recovery from adverse 
events53. The value of retrieval crew non-technical 
skills54, and crew resource management training, 
ideally using simulation, is now well recognized. 
Although there are retrieval services that are known 
to utilize procedures for incident prevention and/
or harm mitigation, this study did not explore their 
impact upon actual incidents and is an area of future 
research.
retrievals are associated with factors known to 
degrade human performance such as fatigue, noise, 
vibration and uncomfortable ambient tempera- 
tures55-57. Furthermore, the consequences of retrieval 
incidents documented in this study—actual patient or 
crew harm in 59%—can potentially generate further 
stress58 and degradation of retrieval staff perform- 
ance. life stressors are more prevalent in individuals 
who have been identified as having contributed to 
aviation accidents59. The extent and the means by which 
these problems affect retrieval team performance 
requires further consideration, as do methods used to 
select retrieval staff. 
This study was limited to voluntary incident 
reporting by retrieval team members and therefore 
would not have captured all the problems associated 
with retrieval. A comparison of incident reports with 
medicolegal reports revealed that certain problems 
such as corneal abrasions, nerve damage and musculo- 
skeletal problems, which only manifest later, are 
grossly under-reported by an incident reporting 
process60. reporting may have also been biased to- 
wards unusual or particularly dangerous incidents or 
those with particular significance to the reporter16,58.
Incidents that occur during retrieval may also 
occur during intra-hospital transport, anaesthesia, 
in the Intensive Care unit and in the emergency 
Department. lessons learnt in these areas should 
also be applied to retrieval, and potentially avoid 
patient harm. For example, deaths as a result of 
undetected oesophageal intubation have virtually 
been eliminated from anaesthesia in Australia60, 
having been a major cause of morbidity and mortality 
world wide prior to 199061. similarly, a case of a 
blocked filter resulting in serious compromise of 
patient ventilation, and which was used to introduce 
a series of papers on crises management62, is as 
relevant to retrieval medicine as it is to the practice 
of anaesthesia. Once documented, such problems 
lend to upgrading crisis management algorithms. 
There are clear benefits in having a central national 
repository of problems from all branches of medicine, 
so that lessons learnt in one discipline can be applied 
to others. Ideally incidents, including those from 
retrieval, should be elicited, classified, stored, and 
analysed in a fashion similar to all other areas of 
medicine.
In summary this study identified and characterized 
incidents that occurred during retrieval, and offered 
insights into potential means of preventing or more 
reliably detecting similar incidents in the future. 
such information can help to better understand the 
complexity of factors associated with retrieval and 
focus strategic interventions that prevent or minimize 
the consequences of retrieval incidents upon staff and 
patients. Future research strategies should be aimed 
towards increasing the scope and depth of informa- 
tion about things that go wrong during retrieval, 
towards better understanding their impact and 
developing and implementing strategies to address 
them. 
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